The Role of CEO's prior experience on Innovation - A contingency perspective by SHI YUAN







THE ROLE OF CEO’S PRIOR EXPERIENCE ON INNOVATION 









A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (BUSINESS) 
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 














I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by 
me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information 
which have been used in the thesis. 























I would like to first express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Professor 
Vivek Tandon. This thesis would not be possible without Professor Tandon’s 
insightful feedback and constant guidance. I also appreciate the very helpful 
feedbacks from two anonymous examiners a lot.  
I feel deeply indebted to my former supervisor, Professor Fu Qiang. As a great 
educator who cares about his students wholeheartedly, he has a positive 
impact on me.  
I am also very grateful to my mentors, Professor Sai Yayavaram and Professor 
Amit Jain. It has been very enjoyable and rewarding working with them for 
the last two years, and the experience has greatly benefited me in the early 
development of the thesis. In the meantime, I sincerely thank all the course 
instructors and colleagues for being a consistent source of inspiration to me. 
I would like extend my sincere thanks to the department and program staff as 
well for their sincere help and support in a variety of administrative matters.  












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................... iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... iv 
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ vi 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................. viii 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................... 5 
2.1 Entrepreneurs, Executives, and Firm Innovation .......................................... 5 
2.2 Scope of Experience and Performance ............................................................ 9 
CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT .................................................. 12 
3.1 CEO Tenure and Innovation ......................................................................... 12 
3.2 CEO’s Experience Scope in Relevant Fields and Innovation ..................... 13 
3.3 CEO’s Experience Scope in Other Aspects and Innovation ....................... 15 
3.4 The Moderating Effect of CEO Power .......................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 4 METHODS......................................................................................... 19 
4.1 Data and Sample ............................................................................................. 19 
4.2 Variables and Measures ................................................................................. 20 
4.3 Endogeneity Strategies ................................................................................... 23 
4.4 Method of Analysis.......................................................................................... 24 
   
v 
 
CHAPTER 5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS .......................................... 26 
5.1 Basic Statistics on CEO Experience .............................................................. 26 
5.2 Main Findings on Executive Characteristics and Innovation ..................... 27 
5.3 Post-hoc Analyses ............................................................................................ 30 
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSIONS .................................................................................. 34 
6.1 Implications from the Findings ...................................................................... 34 
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions ................................................................ 35 
6.3 Contributions to Research and Practice ....................................................... 36 
6.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 37 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 38 


















Building on research on upper echelons, entrepreneurship and learning, this paper 
examines the contingent value of chief executive’s experience on firm innovation. 
Using a sample of chief executives in US public firms in the biotechnology industry 
and accounting for endogeneity with several approaches, I find that it is not the single 
type of experience, but the bundles of multiple types of experience that affect 
innovative performance in a complex way. Specifically, I discover that CEO’s 
experience falls into distinctive bundles that have significant effects on firm 
innovation. Empirical results suggest that broad experience in those areas relevant to 
innovation is beneficial, but limited relevant experience may be worse to innovation 
than no experience. Moreover, extensive experience in other areas and non-profit 
organizations appears to be a liability to corporate innovation. The alternative 
strategy of empowering R&D executives with attention and resource is at best in a 
weak positive relationship with innovation. The findings indicate the importance of 
the contingency role of CEO’s experience-based capability on the macro-level 
innovation outcome. Additionally, consistent with the findings of prior research, I 
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 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
This paper studies the contingent effects of CEO’s prior experience on the innovative 
performance of high-tech firms. Instead of the common approach of testing the 
effects of isolated types of experience on performance, this study views the prior 
experience of chief executives as multiple bundles that have differentiating effects on 
innovation and investigates how the portfolios of single types of field and 
organization experience affect innovation. Specifically, I examine when the scope of 
CEO’s prior field experience contributes or inhibits firm innovation, how CEO’s 
experience in non-profit organizations affects firm innovation, and when CEO’s 
experience matters more to innovation.  
This issue of study is important for at least three reasons. First, although the literature 
in entrepreneurship and upper echelons have been informative on how managers 
affect firm performance, they each provide incomplete theoretical explanations of the 
manager’s experience. Austrian economists (Hayek, 1945; Shane, 2000) view the 
essence of individual's prior experience as the difference in entrepreneurs' 
information about opportunities for the discovery of innovations. Hence, individuals 
are capable of recognizing and exploiting certain innovation opportunities from the 
environment via the knowledge corridor formed by such idiosyncratic prior 
knowledge (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997). Despite Shane and 
Venkataraman's (2000) sound and broad definition of entrepreneurship, such view is 
seldom introduced to study the nexus of executives and firm dynamics after their 
IPOs. However, as opportunity is equally important throughout the organization life, 
an entrepreneurial view extended to the executives in established firms in the 
dynamic industries is critical. Moreover, most entrepreneurship research does not 
address when prior experience may inhibit opportunity identification.  
Unlike the proactive view of managers' capability of opportunity recognition in new 
ventures, upper echelon scholars emphasize that the prior experience may restrict and 
bias executives' cognition base and strategic choice, which results in the research 
focus on relevant issues like controls and incentives (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Following this view, abundant evidences are found for the mechanisms that prior 
experience plays a dynamic role in the allocation of attention to different issues (Cho 
& Hambrick, 2006). Studies on agency theories also point out how to manage 
incentives and arrange corporate governance to incentivize and control executives to 
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enhance R&D performance. Psychological factors like overconfidence or hubris of 
the chief executive are found to be associated with higher innovation (Galasso & 
Simcoe, 2011; Tang, Li, & Yang, 2012). Despite the rich studies up to date, upper 
echelons research seldom acknowledges executive experience as a micro-foundation 
of organization capability. Kroll, Walters, and Wright (2008) provide one of the rare 
examples by highlighting the role of board experience in achieving successful 
monitoring outcomes, which extends the cognition-based framework of individual 
level studies. One interpretation from the study is that cognition and control studies 
may not provide a complete picture of the interplay between executive and firm 
performance if the link between executive experience and capability is missing. 
Second, while studies drawing performance implications from single types of 
executive experience have not been very fruitful, very few studies further examine the 
bundles of multiple types of individual experience. Organization learning scholars 
indicate that it is generally difficult to make straight-forward inferences on 
organizational outcome from executive's experience (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; 
March, 2010). Canella, Finkelstein and Hambrick (2008a) in a review on studies of 
executive experience and organization performance conclude that no executive 
profile that is universally advantageous has been found so far. The same can be said 
to the vast studies on one of the specific learning outcome, the innovativeness of the 
firm. As scholars have noted for some time (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Cannella, 
Park, & Lee, 2008b; Wu, Levitas, & Priem, 2005), fine-grained studies on the impact 
of executive experience on innovation are scant. Moreover, most of the experience 
studies focus on the investigation of single types of experience without further 
considering the joint effects of multiple types of experience. As suggested in previous 
studies (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), it has been neither 
sufficient nor very fruitful to examine the static effects of experience in single areas. 
Therefore, a broader look at the how the experience spans across multiple areas and 
when experience matters more is needed (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Hambrick, 
2007).  
Third, although it is the practical belief that hiring of new executives would source 
their rich experience and expertise to the organization (Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 
2009; Singh & Agrawal, 2011), current research provides little knowledge about 
whether extensive experience actually boosts performance. In popular press, most 
appointment announcements highlight the extensive experience that the executive 
would bring to the firm, indicating the expectation of the firm and the shareholders 
that these newly appointment executives will leverage their experience to create value 
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for the firm. For executives, Raskas and Hambrick (1992) report that around 70%  of 
the CEOs rated the extensive experience in multiple functional areas as an important 
attribute for their successors.  For investors, experience signals the quality of the 
human capital and affects major investment decisions (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). An 
earlier survey on venture capitalists reveals that deficiencies in management accounts 
for one third of all the failures in capital raising (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1985).   
In this study, I propose that broad experience is not universally beneficial to 
innovation performance and that we should view experience as multiple bundles of 
knowledge, thinking and value across multiple fields and organizations. Innovation is 
a systematic and enduring effort that requires the capability to coordinate between 
different divisions, high tolerance for failures, and a long-term orientation (Manso, 
2011). Therefore it is not the expertise in a particular field but rather the bundle of 
experience in many fields relevant to the innovative process that matters to the overall 
innovativeness of the firm. Furthermore, experience is not only the base for cognition 
but also the micro-foundation for capability – the complex interplay behind 
experience limits executives' vision in some fields while enabling the discovery of 
opportunities elsewhere. Therefore, different bundles of experience may carry either 
premium or liability to innovation to the point that it is confounding to treat all 
experience as equal.  
Using a sample of CEOs of public biotechnology firms in the US and controlling for 
firm-level, TMT-level and CEO-level factors and multiple sources of endogeneity, I 
find that CEO experience significantly and robustly predicts innovative performance. 
I first replicate the inversed U-shape relationship between the basic temporal facet of 
CEO experience, tenure, and innovation. From there, it is found that the role of CEO 
experience on innovation is contingent upon whether such experience is in those 
fields relevant to innovation or not. Specifically, experience in limited number of 
innovation-related fields may be more harmful to innovation than no relevant 
experience. Broad experience in many innovation-related fields enhances CEO's 
capability to advance the innovativeness of the firm. Moreover, experience in other 
fields and non-profit organizations can be a liability to firm innovation. Finally, the 
power of CEO captured by CEO duality and founder identity moderates the 
relationship between CEO's experience in relevant fields and innovation in such way 
that the hurdle for reaping the benefits of broad experience is lowered and that the 
positive effect of broad experience is strengthened. I also examine whether the 
presence of R&D manager in TMT, which may enhance the TMT's attention on 
innovation and the power of R&D division, has an impact on the innovative 
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performance of the firm. Results suggest that the positive linkage between the 
presence of R&D managers in TMT and innovation is at best a weak one. 
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: Chapter 2 will briefly review and 
summarize the relevant literature in experience and innovation. Hypotheses on TMT 
level and CEO level will be introduced and elaborated in Chapter 3. Empirical 
methods are detailed in Chapter 4, and results from main analyses and robustness 
tests are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses the contributions and limitations 





















CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will provide a brief review and critique of the current literature on the 
relationship between experience and performance grounded in entrepreneurship, 
TMT, and organizational learning research with a focus on individual-level analysis 
and innovation-related outcomes. First, I will integrate relevant findings on 
manager’s experience and organization innovation and address several limitations of 
the current literature. Then I will highlight the scope of experience and summarize the 
positive and negative mechanisms surrounding it. Afterwards, I will propose several 
unanswered but important questions following this line of thought. 
 
2.1 Entrepreneurs, Executives, and Firm Innovation 
In a dynamic environment, executives such as CEOs play a crucial role in shaping the 
organization's innovative capability. Although the strategic importance of innovation 
to organizations is without question, executives have to consistently face the tension 
between emergent innovation initiatives and needs of incumbent core business 
(Tushman, Smith, & Binns, 2011). Moreover, opportunities for innovation are often 
non-obvious and require a long-term commitment of resources and high tolerance for 
failures (Manso, 2011; Shane, 2000). In order to achieve superior innovative outcome, 
executives need to constantly acquire, configure and combine the dynamic 
capabilities available to the firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Such orchestration is no 
easy task, and thus, comprehensive working experience is almost always needed to 
achieve effective leadership in innovation (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1985; Kor & Mesko, 
2013). 
How do managers matter to innovation? Scholars working in the fields of 
entrepreneurship, upper echelons and organizational learning have established rich 
traditions in this line of inquiry. Entrepreneurship scholars attribute the identification 
of non-obvious opportunities to the knowledge and capability associated with the 
prior experience of the entrepreneur (Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008; Shane, 
2000). On the micro-level of individual cognition, serial entrepreneurs are found to 
have prototypes with clearer definition, richer content and a more realistic focus 
(Baron & Ensley, 2006). In a sample of founding teams of technology start-ups, 
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Gruber and his colleagues (2008) discover that founding teams with prior experience 
in entrepreneurship identify more opportunities for the market entry of the technology, 
which in turn lead to successful performance of the new venture. Moreover, Toole 
and Czarnitziki (2009) report that biotechnology entrepreneurs who have experience 
in academia have superior R&D performance compared to the non-academic 
counterparts. Furthermore, as the quality of new ventures is often difficult to 
determine, prior knowledge also has signaling effects and influences the external 
assessment of the entrepreneur's ability to access and allocate resources (Shane & 
Khurana, 2003). In a sample of MIT patents, Shane and Khurana (2003) find that the 
prior status of the academic entrepreneurs positively impacts the founding behavior. 
Similarly, management experience and academic status are also positive predictors of 
the investment raised and survival of the high-technology ventures in Israel (Gimmon 
& Levie, 2010). Despite the progresses made on the entrepreneurial view of 
individual's prior experience, such view is seldom extended to the studies of the 
innovative performance of the established firms, nor does the research address when 
the experience may hurt the entrepreneurial performance. 
Unlike the entrepreneurship school's proactive view of experience as a foundation of 
capability in the individual-opportunity nexus, upper echelons research tends to frame 
the prior experience of managers as constraints on their cognitive models and shaping 
power of their value preferences (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Cannella et al., 2008a; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Prior experience limits managers' field of perception in 
firms' everyday R&D activities, biases the interpretation of the current internal and 
external situations of the technological change, and thus affects their choice of 
innovation strategy (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Chaganti 
and Sambharya (1987) report that TMTs with more R&D background executives, 
fewer finance background executives and less tenure tend to follow production 
innovation strategies in the tobacco industry. In computer industry, Thomas, Litschert, 
and Ramaswamy (1991) find that younger CEOs with R&D or marketing experience 
are associated with higher likelihood of following market innovation strategies. More 
recent studies find that younger CEOs who have primary experience in marketing and 
R&D and a graduate degree in science tend to invest more in R&D (Barker & 
Mueller, 2002), and founding teams with more PhDs are more likely to adopt open 
science policies (Ding, 2011). McGee, Dowling, and Megginson (1995) demonstrate 
the importance of the alignment of corporate strategy and executive experience and 
find that R&D differentiation strategy is most beneficial to the new venture when the 
management team possess extensive R&D experience. Such finding is corroborated 
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by the observation that R&D-intensive firms are more likely to select CEOs with 
R&D experience and higher education (Datta & Guthrie, 1994). 
Since executives are bounded rational individuals who are limited in the cognitive 
capacity, biased in decision-making, and subject to opportunism especially in face of 
the long-term investment and risk of developing innovation, organizations need to 
design certain structure to effectively motivate the executives to innovate. The 
turnover of CEOs may positively impact the quantity and quality of the firm 
innovation (Bereskin & Hsu, 2011). The presence of a complete functional structure 
at the inception of the firm may help the firm to go public faster (Beckman & Burton, 
2008). The design of the executives' incentive scheme is also an effective way to 
stimulate innovation. When the technological intensity is high for the firm, firms may 
align total incentives for executives with industrial impact of patents and scientific 
publications (Makri, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 2006). Tolerance for early failure and 
reward for successes in the long run should be incorporated in the compensation plan 
to motivate innovation (Manso, 2011). As Lerner and Wulf (2007) suggest, long-term 
incentives for corporate R&D supervisors may be associated with the innovativeness 
of the firm. While the external incentive schemes and organization designs are 
important to R&D and innovation without question, the study on executive 
experience and innovation may complement this research stream by suggesting that 
certain intrapersonal experience may also incentivize executives to tolerate risks and 
failures and make long-term commitment to corporate innovation. 
Some micro-oriented upper echelon studies directly examine the attention and traits 
of managers and organizational innovation. Executive attention, which may emerge 
from external industrial environments and intrapersonal experience, has been found to 
influence strategic and technological change of the organization (Cho & Hambrick, 
2006; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). In a study on the 
technological shift in telecommunication industry, Kaplan (2008) even suggests that 
attention from the CEO can counteract the negative effect resulting from the lack of 
organization-level capability. Outside the high-technology contexts, Yadav, Prabhu, 
and Chandy (2007) discover that CEO attention is an important driver of innovation, 
which is measured as the adoption speed of Internet service in US retail banks. They 
further elaborate that the attention-innovation link still exists when the content of 
attention is not innovation, or the outcome of innovation is not ambiguous or 
uncertain. Furthermore, prior experience may shape manager's attitudes and 
personality, and the past successes may engender hubris (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2011; Musteen, Barker, & Baeten, 2010). Overconfident CEOs who make riskier 
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moves are found to be more likely to pursue innovation for the firms in multiple 
contexts (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Tang et al., 2012). CEOs with liberal attitudes are 
more likely to emphasize on the exploration and innovation of the firm (Musteen et 
al., 2010). This stream of micro-oriented literature generally does not account for 
executive-level experience until a recent study by Kroll and colleagues (2008) on 
directors suggest that director vigilance may be ineffective in monitoring and 
advising unless it is backed up by directors' relevant experience and knowledge.  
Despite the rich findings in the realm of entrepreneurship and upper echelons outlined 
above, scant empirical evidence linking the executive's experience and firm 
performance has been found up to date. Two CEO studies shed light on this topic. In 
a survey on machinery and metalworking firms in Canada, Kitchell (1997)  reports 
that younger, flexible and perseverant chief executives with less tenure and higher 
education is positively associated with firm innovation. Based on another survey of 
more than 2,000 German firms, Rodenbach and Brettel (2012) propose that CEO's 
experience is a micro origin of the dynamic capability of the firm. However, their 
findings are more mixed. In regression analyses, they find the only significant 
predictor of the organization's R&D capability among CEO's functional experience 
variables is the administration experience. Several major limitations further halt the 
interpretation and generalization of the already mixed results. First, the survey data 
prelude the objective measures of the innovation performance and experience. Second, 
the issues on the non-random selection of CEOs, or endogeneity, are overlooked, 
resulting in the concerns about the causal inference. Third, only single types of 
experience are examined, preventing us from knowing how the bundle of experience 
would affect innovation. When we jointly consider the more informative findings on 
strategy and performance in prior experience research, a nuanced interpretation may 
be that: whether experience drives managers to choose innovation-oriented strategies, 
and whether they are able to effectively deliver the innovation outcome with their 
experience, are two different stories. 
Overall, the current literature on manager's prior experience and organization 
innovation suffers from several drawbacks that call for further investigation. First, 
compared with the works on TMT, few studies focus on the experience on individual 
executive’s level, and even fewer individual-level studies incorporate a team-level 
perspective. As Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders (2004) in their review on upper 
echelon research conclude from previous findings, the effects of individual executives 
on firm outcome can be divergent from those of the team (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Carpenter et al., 2004; Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Jensen and Zajac (2004) in their study 
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on executive background and diversification argue that CEO study is necessary to 
complete the TMT study, as results demonstrate that CEO has the highest predictive 
significance in the disaggregated analyses. Second, the capability view of the 
individual experience is generally missing and the flourishing research on non-
observable executive characteristics usually does not account for the observable 
characteristics. While certain types of prior experience are acknowledged for the 
superior innovative outcome, a comprehensive and contingency view of when the 
experience will matter more and whether other experience may hurt performance 
remains unexplored. Third, most of the individual-level prior experience studies view 
functional experience as isolated factors and do not consider the collective effects of 
experience in multiple areas, inviting puzzles of how the combinations of experience 
would affect performance. 
 
2.2 Scope of Experience and Performance 
Prior experience also provides a crucial base for learning (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Individuals and organizations often encounter the myopia of learning in the 
innovative process, overlook distant and unfamiliar fields and focus excessively on 
the exploitation of incumbent capabilities (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). 
To overcome such trap in learning, individuals and organizations may extend their 
experience base into various areas, and leverage the bundle of diverse experience as 
the innovative capability (Cannella et al., 2008b; Kor, 2003; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). 
In terms of innovation, specific technological expertise alone is not sufficient for 
success and should be combined with organization skills (Kakati, 2003). Studies on 
spin-outs have also shown that inheriting the non-technical know-how is at least as 
important as the transfer of technical know-how (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & 
Sarkar, 2004; Chatterji, 2009).  
Research on organizational learning and management teams has offered several key 
insights on how managers' broad experience in many areas would positively impact 
innovation. First, broad experience would expand the cognitive framework of the 
individual and allow him or her to identify more meaningful cognitive patterns from 
the complex arrays of external events (Baron & Ensley, 2006). These patterns 
"connecting the dots" would be a repertoire for potentially creative ideas (Schilling & 
Green, 2011). Such cognitive strength would also enable executives "to learn, and to 
sense, filter, shape, and calibrate" technological opportunities, which lays the micro 
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foundation for the dynamic capability (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Shipilov, 2009; 
Teece, 2007: 1326). Second, broader experience offers more diverse access to 
information and different sources of perspectives and opinions, and significantly 
enhances the knowledge base of the individual (Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007; 
Harris & Helfat, 1997; Huber, 1991). Third, individuals with broad experience are 
more likely to have extensive social networks that entail many weak ties crossing 
functional faultlines (Cannella et al., 2008b; Hansen, 1999). They are also more likely 
to attract members with similarly diverse background into their organization 
(Beckman et al., 2007). Finally, the rich experience across many fields also signals 
the legitimacy to both internal and external members (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). 
Empirical works have documented positive impact of broad prior experience. On the 
organization level, the scopes of experience in the product and market space (Nerkar 
& Roberts, 2004; Shipilov, 2009) and the search of technological knowledge (Katila 
& Ahuja, 2002; Kotha, Zheng, & George, 2011) are found to be associated with 
positive performance. On the project level, Macher and Boerner (2006) find that 
particular area experience improves R&D performance when it is combined with 
knowledge from other areas. On the team level, the diversity of TMT members' 
experience, often referred as TMT heterogeneity, has also received much attention. In 
new ventures, founding teams with broad experience in functional areas and 
organizations are found to get favorable investment decisions (Beckman & Burton, 
2008; Beckman et al., 2007). In the airline industry, Hambrick and Chen (1996) find 
that diversity in TMT's functional experience is associated with the propensity, speed 
and magnitude of the strategic response, and they also find the overall positive effect 
of the diverse TMT on market performance. According to another study on global 
firms in the manufacture sector, TMT diversity may impact the innovativeness of the 
organization via the strategic choice on innovative field (Talke, Salomo, & Rost, 
2010). Dokko et al. (2009) present one of the very few studies on the individual level, 
which proposes that the relevant knowledge and skills obtained from the prior related 
experience has a positive impact on the job performance of the employee. Moreover, 
Cannella and colleagues (2008b) provide another rare example by decomposing the 
TMT functional diversity into the individual level and find the positive impact of 
intrapersonal functional diversity on financial performance. 
Meanwhile, as executives have limited cognitive resources and most management 
know-how can be highly tacit, prior experience can be a liability to innovation. 
Successful experience in the past may lead to self-reinforcement of familiar heuristics 
and rigidify the biased mode of thinking in ambiguous situation (Argote & Miron-
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Spektor, 2011; Audia & Goncalo, 2007; Cannella et al., 2008b). Moreover, the initial 
effort to broad the experience base can be costly, and spreading executives' attention 
to several concurrent projects of wide scope may hurt the performance (Eggers, 2012; 
Macher & Boerner, 2006). Hence, the increase in the scope of experience does not 
always pay premium in performance. Prior TMT studies offer very little insight into 
this matter. A relevant study on CEO tenure and innovation may be illustrative, in 
which Wu and colleagues (2005) discover that the relationship between CEO tenure, 
the simplest form of temporal experience, and firm's innovation depends on whether 
CEO tenure exceeds a threshold. Beyond that we know very little about when the 
scope or breadth of key individual executive's experience matters more to innovation 
and whether broad experience may halt innovation in certain experiences. Given the 
complicated process and potential traps, barriers, and value of experience-based 
learning and doing, these are intriguing questions for research on individual 




















CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter develops the main hypotheses of the study design. I will start with the 
replication of the established inverse U-shape relationship between CEO tenure and 
innovation. Then I will introduce hypotheses on CEO’s experience scope in different 
types of fields and organizations. Last, I propose power as a potential moderator on 
the effects of CEO experience. 
 
3.1 CEO Tenure and Innovation 
Prior research has established the inverse U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure 
and firm performance. Tenure is the basic temporal facet of the CEO’s firm 
experience, and thus provides an ideal starting point for our further exploration of 
other dimensions of experience. Managers need time to gain legitimacy and develop 
effective paradigms for innovation, but in the meantime their thinking becomes 
rigidified and their knowledge becomes obsolete (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). At 
the very beginning, newly appointed chief executives lack the position- and 
organization-specific experience to understand the problems and implement strategies. 
In order to overcome the liabilities of newness, they often need to be engaged in the 
learning process to obtain legitimacy and create repertoire for innovation-related 
managerial tasks (Cannella et al., 2008a; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Shane & 
Khurana, 2003). As the CEO's tenure increases, they develop more paradigms in 
stock for problem-solving and may initiate innovative efforts on a legitimate ground. 
However, CEOs with long tenure may develop a strong sense of dependence on their 
own repertoires and lose the ability to learn new ideas from the outside (Barker & 
Mueller, 2002; Miller, 1991). Moreover, those CEOs who are near the end of their 
tenure are more likely to divert their cognitive resource to make arrangement for their 
departure and avoid taking risk for innovation in the incumbent firm (Simsek, 2007). 
The inverse U-shaped relationships between CEO tenure and organization have been 
found in both technological and non-technological contexts (Henderson, Miller, & 
Hambrick, 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 2001; Wu et al., 2005). In film industry and food 
industry, CEO tenure of intermediate length is found to be most beneficial to 
financial performance (Henderson et al., 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). Similar 
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curvilinear relationship is unveiled for the technological performance of 
biopharmaceutical firms (Wu et al., 2005). Empirical evidences also indicate that the 
dynamism of the industry lower the value of the turning point in tenure length (Wu et 
al., 2005). Based on the findings of the prior studies, I hypothesize the inverse U-
shaped relationship between CEO tenure and innovation as below: 
Hypothesis 1: CEO tenure has an inverse U-shaped relationship with the innovative 
performance of the firm, so that CEO tenure facilitates innovation before reaching 
the threshold, and halts innovation afterwards.  
 
3.2 CEO’s Experience Scope in Relevant Fields and Innovation 
Few executives start their career as generalists in management, and they usually 
develop expertise in specialized fields before being promoted to management 
positions (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Gupta, 1984). On one hand, their technological and 
managerial know-how inherited from the past experience can be a bundled capability 
for innovation that is difficult for other to imitate (Cannella et al., 2008b; Mendonça, 
2009; Teece & Pisano, 1994). On the other hand, in face of the high risk of failure 
and long-term investment before substantial return of R&D activities (Manso, 2011), 
incomplete or narrow experience may significantly dampen executive's assessment 
and implementation of potential technological opportunities. Since innovation is a 
systematic effort that requires the coordination between competing functional areas of 
the organization, the versatility of the prior experience should impact organization 
innovation in a nuanced way. 
In order to successfully initiate and sustain innovation in the complex organization, 
exposures to fields relevant to the creation, integration and recognition of innovation 
are valuable. First, experience in innovation-creation fields such as corporate R&D, 
academic research and law is beneficial, because such experience provides detailed 
knowledge on the development process of innovation. Executives with research 
background may have reasonable expectations of the risk and time of R&D projects, 
and better evaluations of the value of these projects per se. Prior research 
demonstrates that executives with R&D background may allocate more resources to 
research, and new ventures founded by academic entrepreneurs enjoy superior 
performance in invention (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Toole & Czarnitzki, 2009). 
Expertise in law may encourage the firm to convert R&D progress into protectable 
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intellectual properties (Somaya, Williamson, & Zhang, 2007). Executives with 
expertise in law may also take a tougher attitude to protect the intellectual properties 
(Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009). Second, background in innovation-integration 
fields like operations and business development may enable the executive to put the 
innovative strategy on the general picture of operations across specialist functions. 
Specifically, chief executives with operations background may have insight into the 
technical needs of the daily operation, and effectively lower the organization-wide 
disturbance caused by significant research discoveries (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). 
Meanwhile, business development background helps the CEO to envision well-
rounded long-term growth opportunities by connecting the development in R&D with 
the status quo of other functional divisions (Sørensen, 2012). Last but not least, CEOs 
who used to be entrepreneurs or venture capitalists may better identify and evaluate 
opportunities for innovation. Entrepreneurship experience may lead to better sense of 
where to seek opportunities of value creation, and experience in venture capital 
provides skills in assessment of the commercial value of nascent innovations. CEOs 
with such experience are also likely to tolerate failures and provide constant feedback 
in the innovative process. 
When the scope of experience in these relevant fields to enhance innovation is 
increased from none to high, the marginal cost and benefit of extended relevant 
experience may go through different dynamics. As mentioned, innovation is a 
systematic effort affecting the whole organization. The marginal cost stems from the 
risk that the misinterpretation of the situation and inadequate coordination of 
innovation-related activities caused by the limited experience (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Such marginal cost is greatest when the executive possess limited relevant experience 
in innovation. Comparing with executives with no innovation-related experience, they 
are often more recognized for their past success in innovation-related fields and thus 
are more likely to have excessive confidence in the decision-making on innovation 
matters (Audia & Goncalo, 2007; March & Shapira, 1987). However, the limited 
cognition base may lead to oversimplification of the actual situation and ignorance of 
the wider impact of R&D projects to the organization (Levinthal & March, 1993). As 
the scope of experience increases from low to high, the marginal cost should see a 
decline as the executive will have a more comprehensive assessment of the situation 
and can better coordinate the whole organization. To sum, when relevant experience 
increase from zero to low, the marginal cost associated with learning myopia and 
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hubris bump from zero to high; when the relevant experience is raised from low to 
high, such marginal cost declines accordingly.
1
 
Meanwhile, the marginal benefit of broader experience may increase substantially 
when CEOs have broad experience spanning many relevant fields. Such benefit 
should be less than the marginal cost when relevant experience is narrow. 
Nonetheless, versatile CEOs are less prejudicial and have considerable social capital 
from diverse sources (Cannella et al., 2008b; Raskas & Hambrick, 1992), indicating 
that the marginal benefit surpasses cost when experience is broad enough. As a result, 
they are also more likely to overcome the myopia in the search for innovation and 
secure convergent support from various parties on the value chain of innovation 
(Cannella et al., 2008b). Taken together, the total marginal effect may see an initial 
decline, and rise above zero afterwards. And thus we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: CEO’s experience scope in those fields relevant to innovation has a 
curvilinear relationship with the innovative performance of the firm, so that narrow 
experience scope below a certain point halts innovation but broad experience scope 
exceeding a certain point facilitates innovation.  
 
3.3 CEO’s Experience Scope in Other Aspects and Innovation 
While some executives possess the knowledge, skills and value to promote R&D, 
others may view in-house R&D quite differently. Executive’s the prior experience not 
directly related to the innovation and R&D process may be a liability to innovation 
for three reasons. First, executives with innovation-unrelated experience are more 
inclined to devote more of their cognitive resources to non-innovation aspects of the 
firm. Second, executives with innovation-unrelated experience are more likely to take 
a conservative attitude towards innovation and value in-house R&D less. Third, in 
face of the common failures in innovation, they are more likely to have less tolerance 
and feel more compelled to divert the resources elsewhere. 
For illustration, CEOs with corporate finance background are more likely to view the 
firm as a portfolio of financial assets and seek quick growth through transactions in 
the financial market (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Similarly, 
marketing-oriented CEOs may also tend to be more favorable towards using 
marketing strategies to grow sales in the product market. Chief executives who used 
                                                          
1 I thank an anonymous examiner  for suggesting the argument. 
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to be consultants are likely apply the revenue and cost framework to address 
temporary problems (Ramanan, 2012), rather than make long-term commitment to 
the opportunities in innovation. Taken together, CEOs with these backgrounds may 
see R&D "as more of a discretionary expense subject to efficiency concerns" (Barker 
& Mueller, 2002: 786), and allocate more attention to the analyzing and forecasting 
the financial health and market position of the firm (Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010). 
This is somehow consistent with the finding that firms with poor financial 
performance are more likely to select CEOs with expertise in finance (Guthrie & 
Datta, 1997). In the end, decisions on in-house R&D are often left to the discretion of 
the division and innovation often loses in the competition for resources (Tushman et 
al., 2011). Previous research show that finance CEOs are more likely to leverage 
financial controls by implementing acquisitions and unrelated diversifications, which 
is often at the cost of the long-term benefits of the in-house R&D (Herrmann & Datta, 
2006; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Overall, the 
more experience the CEO accumulates in these fields, the more value they will 
emphasize on the market transactions and cost efficiency, and the less likely they will 
overcome the temporal myopia and endure the long-term commitment and high risk 
of innovation (Cannella et al., 2008a; Levinthal & March, 1993; Manso, 2011). 
Carpenter et al. (2004) in their review on upper echelons research suggests that the 
executives' past experience in non-profit organizations (NPOs) like governments and 
other organizations has generally been overlooked. As an extension to the experience 
in different functional fields, I will also examine the effects of NPO experience here. 
It is widely known that NPOs operate under logics and beliefs that are divergent from 
corporations. CEOs with NPO background often face more barriers in gaining 
legitimacy and overcome liability of newness in the firm than those dedicated their 
whole career in the corporate world. The disparate institutional norms imprinted from 
the past affiliations with NPOs may make their prior experience particularly difficult 
to interpret and learn from (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). For example, the principles of search and exploitation of knowledge for non-
profit use can be divergent or even contradictive to the norm in the industry 
(Bunderson, 2003; Huang & Murray, 2009). And in the case of the government, the 
focus is more on the monitoring and regulation of innovation rather than the creation 
of innovation. Moreover, executives with NPO background face more pressure to 
gain the legitimacy for their leadership in for-profit corporations, as they are subject 
to the more doubts about whether they can manage the firm for profit. As a 
consequence, these executives may be inclined to take more conservative attitude 
   
17 
 
towards risky R&D projects because of greater concern about the legitimacy for 
profit or the bureaucratic belief of "doing by the book". To sum up the arguments 
above, we have the following two hypotheses on the liability of experience in other 
fields and in non-profit organizations: 
Hypothesis 3a: CEO’s experience scope in other fields has a negative relationship 
with the innovative performance of the firm.  
Hypothesis 3b: CEO’s experience in other types of organizations has a negative 
relationship with the innovative performance of the firm.  
 
3.4 The Moderating Effect of CEO Power 
Several scholars have been aware of the gap between individual forces and outcomes 
on the higher level. For example, Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) suggest that the 
experiential learning on the individual level have to be embedded in some 
supraindividual arrangement to enable the learning to occur on higher level. Similarly, 
Canella et al. (2008a) point out that the executive characteristics need to be converted 
into implemented strategic choices to achieve organizational outcome. To resolve the 
gap between executive and organization, Hambrick (2007) highlights the importance 
of exploring contingency factors that determine how much executives matter to the 
outcome. Similarly, Mackey (2006) concludes from previous literature that the 
environmental constraints limit the magnitude of the managerial influence on the 
organization. Nevertheless, CEOs with power from the founder identity and board 
control may be able to overcome such constraints and insert their positive impact into 
the organization routine. First, the power enhances the CEO's ability to mold the 
strategic choice at his or her will and thus strengthen his or her influence on the firm 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Second, the power facilitates deeper understanding 
of the firm-specific culture and politics and shields the implementation of innovation 
strategies from barriers originated from these factors (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 
2008; Huckman & Pisano, 2006). Third, the hazard of overconfidence and pitfall in 
learning can be alleviated for CEOs with more power in identity and control, because 
firm-specific knowledge from the very inception would compensate for their limited 
field experience, and the heightened responsibility for both the shareholders and 
employees resulted from duality would drive them to use extra caution when making 
decisions based on their individual experience (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
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Findings from relevant empirical works are largely consistent with the proposition 
that the power of the executives to make decisions shifts the impact on performance. 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) propose that the TMT characteristics are 
significantly associated with performance only when executives have high managerial 
discretion. In their study on CEO turnover and innovation, Bereskin and Hsu (2011) 
report that internal CEOs who are supposed to have more power than outsiders may 
lead to inventions of higher quality and quantity. On the opposite end, the presence of 
predecessor executive, as a potential suppression force on the power of the incumbent 
CEO, is found to dampen the new CEO's chance to make significant gains in 
performance (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). Based on the proposed mechanisms and 
prior findings, we have the final hypothesis on the moderating effects of power: 
Hypothesis 4: CEO power has a moderating effect on the relationship between 
CEO’s experience scope in relevant fields and the innovative performance of the firm 
in a way so that the negative relationship between scope and innovation below the 


















CHAPTER 4 METHODS 
This chapter will cover the empirical strategies of the study in detail, including the 
description of the sample, procedures of data collection, calculation of measures and 
method of analysis. Generally, the sample is assembled from financial data, patent 
data and basic executive data on the firm level and the detailed biographic data on the 
CEO level from multiple credible sources. Accounts are given on the caculation and 
validation of the dependent variable, independent variables, controls and the 
correction for endogeneity bias. Fixed-effects count models will be used to generate 
reliable results from the sample. 
 
4.1 Data and Sample 
The sample of study is the public biotechnology firms founded in the US during 
1995-2002. Biotechnology industry is a suitable setting for this study for several 
compelling reasons. First, as a representative industry of the high-tech sector, 
innovation is of high strategic importance that has to be constantly attended to by top 
executives, and a majority of the technological innovations are observed by patenting 
(Liu, Arthurs, Cullen, & Alexander, 2008). Second, in this dynamic industrial 
environment, the innovative performance is highly contingent upon the quality of the 
human capital (Tzabbar, 2009). Third, the industry as a whole has been accumulating 
experience since 1976, and a remarkable amount of heterogeneous experience should 
be accessible in the market in the study period. 
I excluded private firms in the industry as reliable financial data are not readily 
available, yet controlling for financial aspect of the firm is necessary for the 
multilevel design of the study. I did not include biotechnology firms founded earlier 
because we need to collect and analyze detailed background data on CEOs affiliated 
to the sample firms from multiple electronic resources and the missing data tend to be 
more problematic for CEOs in earlier period.  
The list of biotechnology firms which meet the criteria above was then obtained from 
the BioScan Directory, a credible data source of the biotechnology industry often 
used in studies of the industry. Based on the list of biotech firms, I assembled the 
financial data from Compustat and basic TMT data from Capital IQ, both databases 
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were accessed from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Patent data were 
obtained from the NBER Patent Project, which covers all US patents granted from 
1976 to 2006 (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). I first used dynamic match to obtain 
the patent records already matched to the sampled firms. Then I used the probabilistic 
matching algorithm (Blasnik, 2007) to match the standardized US patent assignee 
names and standardized Compustat names to further eliminate the error of missing 
matches.  
Afterwards I proceeded to identify the CEOs from the basic executive data for the 
sample firms in the observation period and used the name and the affiliated firm of 
the CEO to collect his or her biography from the public information sources online. In 
order to minimize the measurement error caused by incomplete information in data, I 
made efforts to ensure the comprehensiveness of the biographic data by combining 
the biographic information of the same CEO from a variety of sources such as: the 
organization website, LinkedIn profile page, executive profile databases in 
Businessweek, Forbes and Equilar Atlas, CEO background introduction in Wall 
Street Transcript and announcements on management changes from Factiva. The 
final sample for analysis comprises 225 CEOs of diverse backgrounds and 101 
dedicated biotechnology firms.  
 
4.2 Variables and Measures 
To measure innovative performance of the firm, our main dependent variable of 
interest is the patent count of the firm. Although patent-based innovation studies are 
subject to inevitable limitations, few other measures on innovation compare to patent 
in terms of scale and scope. Patent is calculated as the number of patents applied by 
the firm in one-year window. I also calculated the patent count in two-year window as 
an alternative specification in robust tests. 
To test Hypothesis 1, CEO Tenure is measured by the variable Tenure, which is the 
number of years the CEO has been in office. The squared term of the variable Tenure 
is calculated as Tenure Squared to jointly test the inverse U-shaped relationship 
between CEO tenure and innovation.  
To construct the measures for CEO’s experience scope in different fields and 
organizations, a two-step procedure was implemented. First, based on CEO’s 
biography, I created ten dummies for experiences in different fields and two dummies 
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for other types of organizations. Second, I aggregated dummies within different 
categories to create the experience scope measures for the regression analyses. To 
capture CEO’s experience scope in relevant fields, I first categorized seven of the ten 
fields as fields relevant to innovation activities, which are: Academic, Business 
Development, Law, R&D, Operations, Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship. 
Academic was coded as 1 if the CEO has worked in an academia before taking charge 
of the firm, mostly as faculty member or researcher. Business Development was 
coded as 1 if the CEO has served positions related to business development and 
business planning such as Chief Business Officer. Law was coded as 1 if the CEO has 
expertise in law and intellectual property and served such positions as lawyer and 
general counsel. R&D was coded as 1 if a CEO has experiences working in the R&D 
division of corporations before and served such positions as Chief Science Officer 
and principal researcher. Operations was coded as 1 if a CEO has operation-related 
experiences and held positions like Chief Operations Officer. Venture Capital was 
coded as 1 if a CEO has worked in a VC firm before or has been endorsed for his 
expertise in venture capital. Entrepreneurship was coded as 1 if a CEO has 
experience in founding other start-ups or corporate ventures before. All dummies 
were coded as 0 otherwise. Then I calculated the experience scope in relevant fields 
as the sum of the seven field dummies for the CEO, Relevant Fields. To test the 
curvilinear relationship proposed in Hypothesis 2, I also calculated the squared term 
for the variable and labeled it as Relevant Fields Squared. As confirmation of the 
nonlinear relationships proposed in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, I also tested both 
independent variables under the alternative linear assumptions.  
Similarly, I summed the dummies for other fields (finance, marketing and consulting) 
not directly relevant to innovation activities and created the measure for CEO’s 
experience scope in other fields. Finance was coded as 1 if a CEO has held positions 
related to finance and accounting before. Marketing was coded as 1 if a CEO has 
worked in the sales/marketing department before. Consulting was coded as 1 if a 
CEO once worked as a consultant. These dummies were given the value zero 
otherwise. The variable Other Fields is the sum of the three dummies above, and used 
as the independent variable for the test of Hypothesis 3a. To capture CEO’s 
experience in other types of organization, I coded the two dummies, Government as 
the indicator of whether the CEO has working experience in government before, and 
Other NPOs as the indicator of CEO’s experience in other non-profit organizations. 
The two dummies are summed as the variable Other Organizations to test Hypothesis 
3b. To validate the categorization and the measure, I did three supplemental analyses 
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which will be detailed in the next chapter. First, I performed a placebo test by 
replacing the original experience scope variables with those calculated from two 
randomly assigned groups of the same structure. Second, I generated an experience 
scope variable for all field experiences as the substitute for the original scope 
variables and tested its effect. Third, I entered all the individual dummies to replace 
the scope measures and investigated if there is any consistent and significant effect by 
the individual experience dummies.  
Hypothesis 4 proposes the moderating effect of CEO power on the relationship 
between relevant experience and innovation. The CEO power is measured by the 
variable Power, which was assigned the value 1 if a CEO is the chairman of board or 
the founder of the company, 2 if a CEO is a founder and a chairman, and 0 otherwise. 
I implemented control variables on the level of firm, TMT and CEO. Firm-level 
controls include variables capturing both financial and technological aspects. R&D 
controls for the research investment and orientation of the firm and was calculated as 
the ratio of R&D expense and sales. Slack controls for the slack resources available in 
the firm and was calculated as the current assets deducted by current liabilities, and 
then normalized by the total assets. Sale controls the firm size and is the total amount 
of annual sales in million dollars for a given year. Age controls for the organization 
age and is the number of years between the founding and observation time. 
Technological (Tech.) Diversity controls for the portfolio of the firm’s patent stock 
and was calculated as one minus the sum of squared ratio of each 3-digit USPTO 
classes in the patent stock. I also included the dependent variable with 1-year lag, 
Past Performance, in the full model to check the effect of unobserved and variant 
factors.  
I further controlled several key TMT properties, including team size, average age and 
the presence of founders and R&D managers. Size is the number of executives in 
TMT, as a bigger team is more likely to include R&D officials. Age is the average 
age of executives in TMT. In a separate analysis I further divided TMT age into CEO 
age and the average age of other TMT members, and this finer-grained specification 
did not yield significantly different results. The presence of founders is controlled by 
the variable Founders, which was calculated as the number of founders in TMT. The 
presence of R&D personnel in TMT is calculated as the number of R&D officials 
among the TMT members in a specific firm and a given year, labeled as R&D 
Personnel. As the final stage of the control strategy, I controlled two CEO-level 
characteristics, gender and MBA education. Gender was coded as 1 if the CEO is 
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female, 2 if the CEO is transsexual
2
, and 0 if a CEO is male. MBA was coded as 1 if a 




4.3 Endogeneity Strategies 
Endogeneity arises when the treatment of the sample is not randomly assigned in non-
experiment settings, and accounting for endogeneity has been a widely accepted 
standard in management research in recent years (Hambrick, 2007; Hamilton & 
Nickerson, 2003; Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012). Following previous 
research (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Gruber et al., 2008; Hamilton & Nickerson, 
2003; Landis & Dunlap, 2000), I used two strategies to account for the potential bias 
caused by the endogeneity issues. First, I used inverse Mills ratio to correct for the 
potential selection bias from multiple sources in the sample. Second, I addressed 
reversed causality by switching the position of dependent variable, explanatory 
variables and the moderator in the next section.  
Two primary sources of selection biases are directly linked to the research questions 
in this design, namely CEO’s relevant field experience and CEO’s experience in other 
types of organizations. In order to identify the effective selection models, I generated 
binary variables for whether CEO has innovation-related field experience and 
whether CEO has experiences in non-profit organizations as the dependent variables 
for the selection equations. Additionally I propose that the presence of R&D 
personnel in TMT may be endogenous and also correct for whether the TMT includes 
R&D executives. 
To identify the selection functions, I entered all observable firm characteristics 
available and variables capturing firms’ recent changes in finance and technology as 
the independent variables in the probit models with robust standard errors. The probit 
models are specified to predicting the binary outcomes generated earlier. Afterwards, 
I retained those variables that have stable and significant statistical power in 
predicting the outcome. Then I checked the correlations between the retained 
variables and the dependent variable of the main equation and further dropped those 
highly correlated variables. Finally, I checked whether any of the exogenous variables 
                                                          
2 There is only one such case in the CEO sample.  
3 In unreported analyses, I also controlled for CEO’s PhD education, however, I found the negative correlation 
between MBA education and PhD education is high in the sample (correlation = 0.44, p < 0.001) and thus decided to 
retain one variable on education. Nevertheless, including PhD education in the full model did not change the results 
significantly.  
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retained may significantly influence the outcome of the main equation and can be 
readily interpreted in the selection equation.  
Three selection equations are thus identified. To predict whether the CEO has 
relevant field experience, firm age, firm size, financial performance and the location 
in the Greater Boston area are used in the probit model. It turns out that the firm is 
more likely to have a CEO with non-innovation background (i.e. background in 
finance and accounting, marketing and sales, or consulting) if the financial 
performance or the sales volume is poor. Moreover, younger firms and firms in the 
Greater Boston area, a renowned biotech cluster, are more likely to have a CEO with 
expertise in innovation. The last selection equation predicts whether the firm will 
have a CEO with experience in non-profit organizations. Probit model results show 
that older TMT, larger firm size and the location near Washington DC significantly 
increase the likelihood of having a CEO with non-profit organization background. 
Additionally, firm age, TMT size, CEO’s PhD education and CEO’s field experience 
are used to predict the presence of R&D personnel in TMT. It is found that older 
firms with larger TMT are more likely to have R&D officials in their team. CEO who 
lacks innovation-related experience and CEO with a PhD degree may also be more 
likely to invite R&D executives to their team. All the exogenous variables not 
included in the main equation have correlations of 0.05 or lower with the main 
dependent variable, and they do not have significant predicting power when entered 
in the main equation either collectively or separately. Based on the selection 
equations above, the inverse Mills ratios for the presence of R&D personnel, CEO’s 
relevant field experience, and CEO’s experience in other types of organizations were 
thus calculated, and labeled as TMT R&D Personnel, CEO Field Experience, and 
CEO Org. Experience respectively under the category of “Correction for Selection” 
in the analyses.  
 
4.4 Method of Analysis  
Our main dependent variable is the number of patents applied in the year of 
observation, so count models would be appropriate for further analysis. Moreover, 
fixed-effects models can account for the unobserved heterogeneity that is time-
invariant or firm-invariant in our case. A further look at the descriptive statistics for 
the dependent variable demonstrates that negative binomial model is preferred over 
Poisson model for its capability to account for overdispersion of the data. Taken 
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together, I adopted the fixed-effects negative binomial regression models for the main 
analyses (Wooldridge, 2002). To ensure temporal precedence of the causal reference, 
1-year lag is applied to independent variables and controls. Alternative specifications 
of the time lag will also be explored in robustness analyses. 
Meanwhile, econometricians point out that negative binominal models may suffer 
from the incidental parameters problem (Allison & Waterman, 2002). Although using 
Poisson models to estimate overdispersed data would bias the standard errors of the 
coefficients downward, such estimations are consistent and unbiased (Wooldridge, 
2002). As a robustness check, I used Huber/White/sandwich estimator to correct the 
biased standard errors and ran the full model with the fixed-effects Poisson model. 
Results from the Poisson model with robust standard errors are largely consistent 
with the main results, indicating that incidental parameters do not appear to bias the 
main results significantly. 
In addition to utilizing inverse Mills ratio as is outlined in the last section, I also did 
two set of analyses to address the potential reverse causality in the results following 
Landis and Dunlap (2000). First, I switched the independent variables and the 
dependent variable and tested the alternative arguments based on reverse causality 
after making necessary changes to the model specification (e.g., dropping variables 
that are no longer meaningful, changing the model due to different nature of the 
variable). The results suggest that innovative performance does not reversely impact 
any of the independent variables in the sample. In all “switched” models, the only 
significant explanatory variable is the lagged term of the dependent variable. Second, 
I tested the moderating effect of CEO power on the reverse relationship between 
innovative performance and future CEO’s field experience. The insignificant results 












CHAPTER 5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
In this chapter, I will start with an overview of the CEO-level data, and then go 
through the main analyses, interpret the major findings, and briefly report the 
additional results. From there I will also discuss several post hoc analyses performed 
in the study. 
 
5.1 Basic Statistics on CEO Experience 
Table 1 provides an overview of the CEOs’ basic demographic characteristics and the 
distribution of their experience in different fields and organizations. The CEOs in the 
sample tends to be highly uniformed in terms of gender, with male CEO making up 
96% of the sample. Little diversity may also be expected in race, where whites are in 
a similarly dominant position compared with non-whites in a subsample where racial 
information is available.
4
 Meanwhile, around one third of CEOs have an MBA degree, 
and another one third with a PhD degree.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In terms of the field experience relevant to innovation, nearly 40% of all the CEOs in 
sample have experiences in operations, which is also the highest proportion among all 
fields. This may indicate that experiences in operation functions is much valued in the 
general management role in this dynamic industry. Entrepreneurship, R&D and 
business development come next, each with 32-33% of the CEOs. The interpretation 
would be that experiences in the growing of the front-end business, back-end research, 
and the organization as a whole are all important assets for the executive. Next, CEOs 
with academic background constitute 23.56% of the sample, which is an observation 
consistent with prominence of academic entrepreneurs in this field (Ding, 2011). The 
                                                          
4
 I did not include the variable for race here because of missing data. Although I utilized CEOs’ family names, 
undergraduate institutions, and most importantly, photos if available to identify the racial information, many cases 
still cannot be reliably identified. In a subsample where racial information is available, 90% of the CEOs are white, 
and all the none-white CEOs are male. Additionally, I tested the effect of CEO’s race in the subsample and did not 
find significant results.   
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field experiences in law and venture capital are rare for CEOs in the sample, with less 
than 7% and 9% each. This is not surprising if we take into account the fact that these 
two fields are generally connected to many industries. Overall, more than 70% of the 
CEOs have experience in one or two fields. And as can be expected, fewer CEOs 
have broad field experience, with less than 22% of the CEOs’ experience spanning 
across three relevant fields or more.   
For CEO’s experience in other fields and organizations, CEOs with financial or 
marketing background each constitute about 28% of the sample, demonstrating that 
expertise in financial and product market also have their own merits. Fewer CEOs 
have a background in consulting or NPOs (16%-19%). Very few CEOs (around 7%) 
have worked in the government before, possibly caused by the divergent gap in 
institutions and organizations.  
To summarize, although CEOs in the sample may be homogeneous in terms of 
gender and race, their experience in education, different fields of the corporate 
functions and different types of organization is highly diverse. No single experience 
is shared by the majority of the CEOs, and fewer CEOs have broader experiences in 
many fields. These findings on the CEO-level data also warrant our further 
investigations into the impact of experience on innovation.  
 
5.2 Main Findings on Executive Characteristics and Innovation 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables in 
the regression analyses. The descriptive statistics of the CEO-level variables in the 
firm-sample are consistent with the results represented in Table 1, suggesting that it is 
unlikely that CEOs with certain features are over-represented or under-represented in 
the analysis. Overall, the average of the CEO’s experience scope in innovation-
related fields is less than 2, which implies that most CEOs exploit their skills in one 
or two specific fields of expertise before taking over the general management role and 
that exploration to gain experience in many fields remains uncommon. Meanwhile, 
the average tenure in the sample appear to be long, suggesting that the labor market 
for the chief executive in this industry may be quite constrained in demand due to the 
moderate turnover rate. Moreover, CEOs are on average powerful in the sample, with 
one or two powerful CEOs in every three CEOs in the observation period. The 
correlation table did not yield any extremely high correlation between variables, and 
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the correlations between independent variables are below 0.15, suggesting good 
discriminant power.  To confirm that multicollinearity does not distort the results 
severely, I further checked the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the main models in 
the post hoc analyses.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 3 displays the main results from fixed-effects negative binomial regressions. 
First, I entered the basic firm-level controls in Model 1. Results are much as expected 
and similar to previous findings. More investment into R&D activities and more slack 
resources at disposal will increase innovative output. Obsolete firms are subject to 
higher chance of losing innovative capability. Maintaining a diverse technology 
portfolio that may offer more recombination opportunities can also enhance 
innovation. In Model 2, I added the TMT-level variables. As discussed earlier, the 
presence of R&D personnel in TMT may be endogenous, so I also included the 
inversed Mills ratio to correct the bias. In Model 3, I further added CEO-level 
variables into the model to test the differentiated experiential effects proposed in 
Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b. I added the 
corrections for the potential selection bias of CEO’s field and organizational 
experience accordingly. Among the basic firm-level controls, sales, R&D intensity 
and firm age predict innovative performance. Among TMT-level variables, the 
coefficient of R&D Personnel becomes marginally significant (p < 0.10) in this more 
informative model specification. On the CEO-level, the results show that gender and 
MBA education of the CEO do not significantly impact innovation, while CEO’s 
tenure and experience make a difference. Both the original term and squared term of 
CEO tenure are significant at highest level (p < 0.001), which is consistent with the 
inverse U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and innovation proposed in 
Hypothesis 1.  
As Hypothesis 2 would predict, I find the significant curvilinear relationship between 
experience scope in relevant fields and innovation. The interpretation is that broad 
experience in innovation-related fields enhances innovation and that narrow 
experience may be worse than no experience. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, 
experience scope in irrelevant fields has a significant and negative relationship with 
innovation. Hypothesis 3b argues that experience in other types of organizations also 
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has a negative impact on innovation. The coefficient for experience in other types of 
organizations is negative and significant, offering empirical support for Hypothesis 
3b. Furthermore, the correction terms for R&D personnel and CEO field experience 
are not significant, suggesting the selection bias may not be salient for both scenarios 
in the analyses. Nevertheless, the correction term for CEO’s organizational 
experience is marginally significant, suggesting that there might be some selection 
effects for CEOs with NPO experiences ongoing.  
In Model 4, I introduced the interaction term of CEO power and CEO experience 
scope in relevant fields to test the moderating effect of CEO power proposed in 
Hypothesis 4. All the previous findings are still valid in Model 4, and the newly-
added interaction term is significant and positive, confirming the prediction of 
Hypothesis 4. From Model 4, we can also calculate the threshold for the curvilinear 
relationships proposed in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The calculation reveals that 
other conditions equal, the CEO enhances the innovative capability of the firm most 
in their third to fourth years of tenure. Moreover, CEOs’ experience in fields relevant 
to innovation makes positive contributions to firm innovation when such experience 
falls into more than two relevant fields. Additionally, Wald test shows that the 
negative impacts from experience in irrelevant fields and organizations do not differ 
significantly in terms of magnitude.  
To check whether unobserved but variant factors would significantly influence the 
estimation, I included the 1-year lagged term of the dependent variable (DV) as an 
additional control for past performance in Model 5 as suggested by previous research 
(Gruber et al., 2008; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). Results show that the estimation 
for all the other coefficients remains unaffected, and that the effect of the lagged 
dependent variable is highly insignificant. Therefore, the unobserved and variant 
factors not controlled by the fixed-effects model are unlikely to be a serious issue 
here. Finally, I tested the magnitude of multicollinearity in our models. The variance 
inflation factor (VIF) is 6.18 for Model 5 and 4.26 when the squared terms and the 
lagged DV are dropped. Neither of the values is close to 10, the rule of thumb for the 
detection of multicollinearity. Given the stable and significant estimations across 
different specifications, the multicollinearity does not seem to jeopardize our results 
here. In additional analyses unreported here, I tested the main effect of CEO power 
and its moderating effects on other experience variables, all of which are insignificant. 
It could be that CEOs not familiar with innovation devote their attention and leverage 
their power in other aspects of the corporation affairs.  




Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
To conclude, Hypothesis 1 is empirically supported, as I find that CEO tenure is in an 
inverse U-shaped relationship with innovation, with the peak of the curve located 
somewhere between three years and four years. Empirical results are also consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, suggesting that CEO’s experience scope in relevant fields only 
provides substantial benefits to innovation when the CEO has experience in more 
than two relevant fields. On the contrary, experiences in irrelevant fields and non-
profit organizations have significant and negative impacts on innovation as predicted 
by Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b. Finally, I find empirical evidence that power 
significantly moderates the relationship between relevant experience and innovation, 
confirming Hypothesis 4.  
 
5.3 Post-hoc Analyses 
To further understand the moderating effect of CEO power and the dynamic impact 
of the CEO experience on innovation, I plot the marginal effect of CEO’s experience 
scope in relevant fields in scenarios where CEO is neither a founder nor the chairman 
of board (power = 0, the least powerful), a founder or the chairman (power = 1, more 
powerful), or a founder and a chairman (power = 2, the most powerful). The 
moderating effect graph is presented as Figure 1.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In Figure 1, we can see that power moderates the relationship between CEO’s 
experience scope in relevant fields and innovation differently depending on whether 
experience scope exceeds the threshold of two. When CEO’s relevant experience 
covers no more than two fields, the slope between the marginal effect on patent 
output and experience is downward for all types of CEOs, but the steepest decline is 
observed for the least powerful CEOs and the trend is relatively flat for the most 
powerful CEOs. When CEO has relevant experience in more than two such fields, the 
   
31 
 
marginal effects become non-negative in the scenario of founder-chairman CEO first, 
and later when the CEO is least powerful. The widening gap between the marginal 
effects in different scenarios also suggests that the part of the upward slope is steepest 
for the most powerful CEOs and least steep for the least powerful CEOs. Comparing 
with the least powerful and most powerful counterparts, the marginal effect of 
relevant experience for the more powerful CEOs is always situated somewhere in-
between, which is consistent with the prediction of the moderating effects. 
Additionally, statistics on the marginal effects show that contingent upon the power 
of CEO, the marginal effect of experience on patent count in three relevant fields 
ranges from -1.5 to 1.5. It is further estimated that CEO’s extensive experience in 
more than three relevant fields would help the firm to yield additional 5 to 23 patents.  
Table 4 presents four robustness tests on alternative specifications on the dependent 
variable, estimation model and relationships. First, I use the patent count in the next 
two years instead of one year as the alternative specification for the dependent 
variable in Model 1. Results suggest that CEO tenure and experience have a lasting 
effect on innovative performance, and all the main findings still hold in the longer 
window time. Second, to check the robustness of the results against different model 
specification, I run the regression with fixed-effects Poisson model and used robust 
standard errors to correct for the bias caused by the overdispersion of the variance. 
Fixed-effects Poisson model provides additional insight into the results because it can 
rule out the incidental parameters problem (Allison & Waterman, 2002). The results 
are consistent with the main analyses. Third, I test the alternative linear assumption 
on the relationship between CEO tenure and innovation in Model 3 by removing the 
squared term of CEO tenure. While all the other independent variables still remain 
consistent and significant, the original term for CEO tenure becomes highly 
insignificant, suggesting that such assumption does not work. Similarly, I also drop 
the squared term for relevant field experience in Model 4 to test the linear assumption 
on relevant field experience and innovation. The field experience variables, along 
with the moderator all drop to insignificance. Taken together, our results are robust to 
the longer time window and the alternative estimation model. The alternative linear 
assumptions on CEO tenure and relevant field experience do not receive empirical 
evidence.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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To further validate our experience measures, Table 5 provides the results of three 
supplemental analyses on the decomposed experience variables and two falsification 
tests. First, I replace the measure of relevant field experience by the seven dummies 
for the relevant fields in Model 1. It is found that the dummies for academic and 
entrepreneurship background are negative and significant. The variables for 
experience scope in other fields and organizations become insignificant. I then 
disaggregate the scope measures for other fields and organizations as the five 
corresponding field and organization dummies in Model 2. The relevant field 
experience scope variables are robust to the specification. Marginal statistical 
significance is detected for the finance dummy and the other NPO dummy, both of 
which demonstrate negative effects. Last, I decompose all the measures and entered 
all the dummies in Model 3 to fully examine the potential effects of individual 
dummies. All the dummies are insignificant, and several coefficients have reversed 
signs. I rule out the possibility of inflated standard errors caused by multicollinearity 
by calculating the VIF for the model and the dummies. The VIF for the dummies 
ranges from 1.16 to 4.34, and the mean of the VIF for all dummies is 2.05. The value 
of VIF for the full model is 5.11. None of these indicators show any sign of severe 
multicollinearity. Taken together, none of the individual dummies demonstrates 
stable and significant statistical effect on the dependent variable, it is the joint force 
of various field and organization experiences, rather than the experience in a specific 
field that matters to CEO’s capability to lead the firm to innovate. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The falsification analysis in Table 5 has two parts, a placebo test reported in Model 4 
and a test of the alternative measure of experience scope based on all fields reported 
in Model 5. In order to justify that the dichotomy of relevant fields and other fields is 
not arbitrary and that the statistical results are not driven by methodological 
artificiality, I perform a placebo test in Model 4 by replacing the independent 
variables with two fictitious experience scope variables while keeping the rest of the 
model in the exact same form (Nanda & Sørensen, 2010). Instead of the meaningful 
categorization of the ten fields based on relevancy to innovation, I randomly assign 
the ten field dummies into two groups, with Group I standing for fictitious relevant 
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fields and Group II standing for fictitious other fields
5
. Group I includes venture 
capital, finance, business development, operations, law, R&D and consulting, and 
Group II includes entrepreneurship, academic and marketing. Random Group I is the 
sum of the dummies in Group I, and Random Group II aggregates the dummies in 
Group II. Additionally, Random Group Experience functions as the fictitious control 
for selection of whether CEO’s field experience falls in certain random group. Results 
of Model 4 suggest that fictitious experience scope measures based on random 
assignment do not have sufficient statistical power in predicting performance like 
their actual counterpart.  
Finally, I drop the categories and aggregated all field experience into a single 
experience scope variable, All Fields, to test whether all experiences matter to 
innovation in the same way. Model 5 in Table 5 reports the results of the test, 
indicating the non-significance of the aggregated measure. Additional test of the 
linear assumption on the aggregated experience scope also produces insignificant 
results. Therefore, I posit that experiences in different fields fall in different 
categories depending on its relevance to innovation, and it is confounding to examine 
all experiences without necessary differentiation. Furthermore, to rule out the 
possibility that the effect is driven by some specific combinations of experience 
instead of the general scope, I count the number of combinations of the relevant field 
experience for CEOs in the sample. It turns out that there are 12 actual combinations 
for 2 fields, 17 for 3 fields, and 9 for more than 3 fields. Hence, it is unlikely that the 








                                                          
5
 The random assignment starts with sorting the dummies alphabetically. Then a random 
number between 0 and 1 is assigned to each of the dummies following the order. If the random 
number falls below 0.30, I assigned the dummy to Group II, otherwise the dummy goes to 
Group I. The assignment process terminates when the slots in one of the group are all filled. 
Group I has seven slots resembling relevant fields, and Group II has three.  




CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSIONS 
In this final chapter of the paper, I will discuss important implications from the 
findings, limitations and future directions of the study. Then I will summarize the key 
contributions of the study to research and practice. Finally, I will wrap up the paper 
with a brief conclusion of the study. 
 
6.1 Implications from the Findings 
Several implications can be drawn from the main findings. First, different types of 
experience may be interrelated and function in a collective way. As we find that it is 
the portfolios of experience, rather than single types of experience that matter to 
organizational outcome. Second, experience falls into distinct bundles that have 
differentiating effects on innovation. Some experience can be premiums, while other 
experiences are liabilities to firm innovation. Third, relevant experience is not always 
good, as limited relevant experience leads to misinterpretation with overconfidence 
and failure in coordination. Successful innovative efforts require the not only the 
creation, but also the assessment and integration of the R&D outcomes. Overall, 
CEO’s individual experience only functions as the micro-foundation of firm’s 
innovative capability when it is both relevant and broad. 
Alternative explanations may suggest that R&D executives assume more direct 
responsibility for innovation than CEO and thus matter more to innovation. The 
inclusion of R&D executives in TMT brings attention (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Tushman et al., 2011), knowledge (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004) and legitimacy 
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006) to R&D and innovation. Nevertheless, the weak empirical 
findings on the positive link between R&D personnel in TMT and innovative 
performance suggest that R&D heads may be more subject to the control of CEO in 
the organizational hierarchy and their role in innovation might not be as salient as 
expected.  
Another implication from the findings stems from the endogeneity issues. Regression 
results demonstrate that the majority of hypothesized effects are significant even after 
endogeneity is accounted for. Moreover, the correction terms do not reach 
conventional significance level, indicating that the selection issue might not be too 
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severe. To understand why endogeneity does not overturn the key findings, I will 
review the two main alternative arguments grounded in endogeneity, which are 1) 
CEOs with certain prior experience are appointed by the firm to solve specific 
problems; and 2) CEOs with certain experience have superior capability to select 
firms with high potential for innovation. Reasonable as these arguments sound, they 
both bear very strong assumptions about the effective matching process of the human 
capital market for executives in this industry, namely 1) Firms that wish to hire CEOs 
with certain experience can actually get their ideal candidates; and 2) capable CEOs 
who successfully identify the high-potential firm can join the firm at their will. As the 
descriptive statistics have demonstrated earlier, the market for highly skilled 
executives in biotech industry is not a big one. Not many people are qualified and 
available to lead high-tech firms to succeed in this competitive industry. Even if we 
assume that the supply of executives for biotech firms is abundant, whether the 
demand side of the market is strong enough to allow CEO candidates to "select" 
which company to go is questionable. Therefore, empirically endogeneity might not 
be a severe issue in this case, and theoretically the imperfection of the matching 
mechanism of the market for executives may partially offset the bias caused by non-
random selection.  
 
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
The study has several limitations that can be addressed by future studies on the 
similar track. First, this is a single-industry study that only examines a very specific 
form of innovation, the patented technological innovations. Although the paper 
makes an effort to offer a general view of executive experience in hope that it is 
applicable to other industries, it is also expected that different industrial contexts 
would produce very different profiles for the ideal executive. Future studies analyzing 
managers' experience in small firms, in non high-tech industry, and in emerging 
economies would be valuable. Moreover, innovation comes in a wide array of forms 
other than patents, although patenting as a form of technological innovation is a 
critical aspect of innovation performance in this context. Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge that although some types of CEO experience appear to be a liability for 
technological innovation here, they may be valuable assets for innovations in other 
realms. Even in the realm of patenting analysis, I only measure the quantity but not 
the quality of the patents, which invites the question for future scholars to explore 
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whether CEOs will have influence on the quality of innovation. It also remains 
largely unknown how the same types of executive experience would matter to other 
dimensions of the firm performance, such as social responsibility performance. 
Future research addressing these puzzles can provide extra value to the literature as 
well.  
Third, due to the constraint of data, I cannot provide a more detailed examination of 
the mechanisms of how executive experience drives innovation. But some empirical 
results may still point to the potential solutions to the black-box problem, which is a 
common criticism of TMT research (Hambrick, 2007). In Table 3, we can observe 
that the variable for financial slack becomes marginally significant after TMT-level 
variables are introduced (Model1 to Model 2), and variables for financial slack and 
technological diversity of the patent stock lose significance after CEO-level variables 
are entered. These changes suggest a possible mediating process that invites future 
research: the effect of technological and financial resources available to R&D might 
be mediated by the configuration of TMT and CEO, suggesting that it is how the 
TMT and CEO allocate the current financial slack and leverage the technology 
portfolio that makes a difference to future innovative outcome.  Future work that can 
unveil the quality of the experience, the sequence of the experience and the 
interaction of the experience between different individuals will also significantly 
advance our understanding of the experience effects.  
 
6.3 Contributions to Research and Practice 
Notwithstanding, this study makes several key contributions to the experience study 
in TMT, entrepreneurship and organizational learning. First, this study contributes to 
the upper echelons research by showing that how the combination of diverse field 
experience of the chief executive may lay the micro-foundation of the innovative 
capability of the firm while acknowledging that certain other experience may also 
constrain executives’ capability to innovate. Second, this study also extends the prior 
experience research in entrepreneurships by demonstrating that experience may not 
always pay in performance and that the possession of information elsewhere can lead 
to the overlook and suppression of opportunity discovery in the focal area. Third, this 
study also enrich the learning literature by proposing that myopia, superstitions and 
hubris in learning create significant initial hurdles for individual's experience 
spanning that might enhance outcome on the organization level. Fourth, by analyzing 
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ten fields and two organizational types on the CEO level, incorporating important 
TMT-level and firm-level attributes and accounting for multiple sources of 
endogeneity, I provide a most comprehensive empirical analysis on CEO functional 
experience and innovation.  
With cautions on the limitation of the research, several practical implications can be 
drawn from the study. First, for firms in search of ideal executives, it appears that 
executive turnover at a certain pace is good and that generalists are preferred over 
specialists for the CEO position. Second, for firms which have versatile CEOs in 
office, it might be advisable that the CEO have more say and credit in making 
innovation strategies so as to leverage his or her rich experience. Third, for educators 
in the executive development programs, while this study reiterates the well-known 
importance of exposure to diverse functional areas, it also suggests that executives 
should be reminded the limitation of their own experience even when it is highly 
relevant. The message that needs to be conveyed is that what they know and what 
they see may not be the full picture even if they believe so.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Integrating perspectives and findings from research in upper echelons, 
entrepreneurship and organizational learning, I provide a comprehensive view of how 
chief executive's experience may affect the organization's innovative performance. 
The value of CEO experience for innovation is found to be contingent upon relevancy 
and power, and only the rich combination of relevant experience delivers the value. 
Moreover, results suggest that CEOs face initial hurdles when leveraging their 
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Table 1. Distribution of CEO Experiences
1
 
Variables Observations Proportion 
Gender 
  
Male 216 96.00% 
Female 8 3.56% 
Education Experience 
  
MBA 77 34.22% 
PhD 81 36.00% 
Experience in Relevant Fields 
  
Academic 53 23.56% 
Business Development 74 32.89% 
Entrepreneurship 73 32.44% 
Law 14 6.22% 
Operations 86 38.22% 
Research & Development 82 32.44% 
Venture Capital 19 8.44% 
Experiences in One Field 80 35.56% 
Experiences in Two Fields 79 35.11% 
Experiences in Three Fields 36 16.00% 
Experiences in More than Three Fields 13 5.78% 
Experience in Other Fields 
  
Finance 64 28.44% 
Marketing 64 28.44% 
Consulting 41 18.22% 
Experience in Other Types of Organizations 
  
Government 16 7.11% 
Other NPOs 37 16.44% 
 
1
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
1 2
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Firm-level: 
1. Patent 0.84 3.42 1 
               
2. R&D 22.36 97.71 0.01 1 
              
3. Sale 63.09 197.34 0.13* -0.07* 1 
             
4. Slack -0.08 7.94 0.02 -0.54* 0.02 1 
            
5. Age 7.88 3.56 -0.28* -0.03 0.05 -0.06* 1 
           
6. Technological Diversity 0.12 0.27 0.43* -0.01 0.17* 0.03 -0.32* 1 
          
TMT-level: 
7. Size 3.28 1.29 -0.11* 0.03 3E-3 -2E-3 0.21* -0.14* 1 
         
8. Age 49.90 5.91 -0.11* 0.01 0.08* -0.08* 0.45* -0.20* 0.13* 1 
        
9. Founders 0.72 0.80 0.05 -0.01 -0.11* -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.33* 0.01 1 
       
10. R&D Personnel 0.36 0.61 0.06* 0.03 -0.06* -0.07* -0.02 0.04 0.37* -2E-3 0.37* 1 
      
CEO-level:  
11. Gender 0.05 0.30 -0.02 0.12* 0.08* -0.17* -1E3 0.04 5E-3 -0.05 0.07* -0.07* 1 
     
12. MBA 0.36 0.48 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.11* 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.10* 1 
    
13. Tenure 4.57 3.05 -0.17* -0.08* 0.10* 0.04 0.53* -0.15* 0.10* 0.33* 0.15* -0.02 0.06* -0.03 1 
   
14. Relevant Fields 1.76 0.99 0.06 0.10* -0.02 -0.07* -0.08* 0.05 0.10* 0.07* 0.04 0.06* 0.12* -0.13* 0.07* 1 
  
15. Other Fields 0.69 0.73 -0.04 2E-3 -0.11* -0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.06* -0.05 0.07* -0.08* 0.26* -0.11* -0.14* 1 
 
16. Other Organizations 0.17 0.38 0.02 0.13* 0.16* -0.10* -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.08* -0.08* -0.09* 0.25* -0.11* -0.09* 0.14* -0.13* 1 
17. Power 0.67 0.71 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09* 0.10* -0.16* -0.11* 0.35* 0.02 0.11* -0.16* 0.19* -0.04 -0.14* -0.06* 
 
1 n = 730 
2 * p<0.05 
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R&D 2E-3* (6E-4) 2E-3* (8E-4) 2E-3* (7E-4) 2E-3* (7E-4) 2E-3* (7E-4) 
Sale 2E-3 (2E-3) 1E-3 (1E-3) 0.01† (0.01) 0.01† (0.01) 0.01† (0.01) 
Slack 0.72** (0.28) 0.52† (0.30) 0.18 (0.32) 0.19 (0.32) 0.20 (0.32) 
Age -0.43*** (0.04) -0.56*** (0.07) -0.87*** (0.26) -0.62* (0.28) -0.63* (0.28) 
Tech. Diversity 1.58*** (0.26) 0.97** (0.30) 0.10 (0.33) 0.07 (0.34) 0.07 (0.34) 
TMT-level: 
Size   -0.29 (0.24) -0.88 (0.75) -0.44 (0.88) -0.57 (1.00) 
Age 
  
-0.05* (0.03) 0.19 (0.14) 0.21 (0.16) 0.20 (0.16) 
Founders 
  
-0.21 (0.28) 0.26 (0.45) 0.21 (0.46) 0.22 (0.46) 
R&D Personnel 
  
0.34 (0.22) 0.41† (0.21) 0.37† (0.21) 0.36† (0.21) 
CEO-level:  
Gender 
    
3.72 (2.80) 3.96 (3.32) 3.87 (3.22) 
MBA 
    
-0.93 (1.10) -1.84 (1.58) -1.79 (1.51) 
Tenure     1.60*** (0.27) 1.46*** (0.27) 1.42*** (0.31) 
Tenure Squared     -0.20*** (0.03) -0.20*** (0.03) -0.20*** (0.04) 
Relevant Fields     -6.55** (2.09) -9.45** (3.09) -9.32** (3.04) 
Relevant Fields Squared     1.68** (0.56) 2.42** (0.80) 2.40** (0.78) 
Other Fields     -3.03* (1.34) -3.59* (1.52) -3.65* (1.53) 
Other Organizations     -2.02* (0.97) -2.92** (1.12) -2.98** (1.14) 
Relevant Fields × Power       0.52* (0.25) 0.51* (0.25) 
Correction for Selection:  
TMT R&D Personnel 
  
1.51 (1.36) 4.29 (4.39) 1.86 (5.12) 2.55 (5.73) 
CEO Field Experience     -6.70 (5.38) -6.33 (5.90) -6.31 (5.92) 
CEO Org. Experience     -13.49† (7.49) -15.02† (9.05) -14.74† (8.83) 
Past Performance 
        
3E-3 (0.01) 










































1 Standard errors in parentheses 
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R&D 2E-4 (5E-4) 2E-3*** (5E-5) 2E-3* (9E-4) 2E-3* (8E-4) 
Sale -4E-4 (9E-3) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01† (3E-3) 0.01* (3E-3) 
Slack 0.18 (0.22) 0.35 (0.24) 0.61† (0.35) 0.43 (0.36) 
Age -0.84*** (0.25) -5.30*** (0.51) -0.75*** (0.23) -0.84*** (0.24) 
Tech. Diversity 0.18 (0.26) 0.15 (0.46) 0.86** (0.33) 0.86** (0.33) 
TMT-level: 
Size -0.36 (0.66) -0.32 (1.42) -1.40* (0.68) -1.60* (0.73) 
Age -0.16 (0.21) -0.26 (0.61) 0.08 (0.08) 0.08 (0.07) 
Founders 0.39 (0.39) -0.59 (0.54) -0.49 (0.33) -0.44 (0.32) 




74.87*** (17.85) 1.52 (1.61) 2.53† (1.46) 
MBA -0.88 (1.23) 1.53 (14.40) -0.74 (0.79) -0.67 (0.77) 
Tenure 1.18*** (0.24) 5.94*** (0.46) -0.03 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 
Tenure Squared -0.17*** (0.03) -0.19*** (0.04) 
    
Relevant Fields -10.46*** (2.95) -86.12*** (12.20) -4.28* (1.90) -0.21 (0.35) 
Relevant Fields Squared 2.64*** (0.78) 16.21*** (3.70) 1.18* (0.52) 
  
Other Fields -3.81** (1.31) -43.25*** (4.60) -2.45* (1.05) -1.52 (0.95) 
Other Organizations -2.73** (0.88) -37.69*** (2.28) -3.04** (0.96) -2.40** (0.84) 
Relevant Fields × Power 0.59** (0.22) 5.76*** (0.63) 0.41* (0.20) 0.16 (0.16) 
Correction for Selection:  
TMT R&D Personnel 1.38 (3.77) 1.42 (7.90) 7.98* (3.93) 9.37* (4.23) 
CEO Field Experience 1.14 (2.94) -3.59 (3.51) -2.54 (4.44) -3.40 (4.53) 
CEO Org. Experience 6.09 (12.98) 15.26 (36.41) -6.04 (4.17) -6.49† (3.32) 
Constant 36.23 (32.23) 
  


































1 Standard errors in parentheses 
2 † p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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R&D 2E-3 * (7E-4) 2E-3* (7E-4) 2E-3 * (7E-4) 2E-3* (7E-4) 2E-3* (7E-4) 
Sale 0.02* (0.01) 0.01† (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.01*** (3E-3) 0.01* (3E-3) 
Slack 0.36 (0.31) 0.18 (0.32) 0.38 (0.32) 0.33 (0.28) 0.29 (0.31) 
Age -0.89* (0.37) -0.87** (0.27) -1.03† (0.60) -0.88*** (0.20) -0.94*** (0.22) 
Tech. Diversity -0.04 (0.33) 0.09 (0.33) -0.06 (0.35) 0.16 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33) 
TMT-level: 
Size 0.46* (0.23) 0.27 (0.19) 0.41† (0.24) 0.49 (0.42) 0.12 (0.09) 
Age 0.97 (1.09) -0.75 (0.78) 0.79 (1.19) 0.13 (0.08) -0.78* (0.39) 
Founders 0.04 (0.49) 0.18 (0.50) 0.06 (0.53) -0.84 (0.72) 0.12 (0.47) 
R&D Personnel 0.27 (0.22) 0.43† (0.22) 0.29 (0.27) 0.34 (0.22) 0.40† (0.22) 
CEO-level:  
Gender 19.69** (6.91) 5.34 (4.08) 14.13* (6.96) 4.71 (2.01) 3.87† (2.02) 
MBA -8.83** (3.12) -1.72 (1.89) -6.09 (4.14) -1.64 (1.05) -2.00† (1.14) 
Tenure 2.01*** (0.36) 1.63*** (0.27) 2.12*** (0.61) 1.50*** (0.25) 1.50*** (0.27) 




      
Relevant Fields Squared 
  
1.92** (0.69) 
      
Venture Capital -8.38 (461.29) 
  
0.70 (2438.37) 
    
Business Development -3.84 (3.29) 
  
-4.53 (2.97) 
    
Academic -0.63 (2.20) 
  
-2.13 (5.84) 
    
R&D -2.26* (1.09) 
  
-2.70 (1.88) 
    
Operations -0.02 (3.02) 
  
-0.23 (2.18) 
    
Law -9.97 (7.59) 
  
0.57 (7.71) 
    
Entrepreneurship -7.09* (2.89) 
  
-9.71 (8.45) 
    
Other Fields 0.51 (2.94) 
        
Finance 
  
-4.22† (2.24) 5.47 (5.41) 
    
Marketing 
  
-2.97 (2.08) 0.46 (3.91) 
    
Consulting 
  
-2.23 (2.94) -5.39 (5.49) 
    
Other Organizations -4.06 (2.63) 
    
-1.89† (1.01) -1.79* (0.85) 
Government 
  
-2.03 (2.88) -8.85 (5.85) 
    
Other NPOs 
  
-1.87† (1.03) -3.86 (3.85) 
    
Random Group I 
      
-3.90 (2.76) 
  
Random Group I Squared 
      
0.83 (0.68) 
  
Random Group II 




        
-1.87 (1.55) 
All Fields Squared 




TMT R&D Personnel -5.85 (6.19) 3.53 (4.55) -4.84 (6.69) 2.39 (2.36) 3.72† (2.26) 
CEO Field Experience -5.69 (5.86) -6.21 (5.96) -6.30 (7.16)     
CEO Org. Experience -30.88* (13.30) -18.55 (11.53) -27.54† (14.10) -8.39† (4.51) -8.84† (4.76) 
Random Group 
Experience       
-18.96 (11.93) 
  
Constant -71.55* (27.81) -27.89 (25.22) -64.37* (29.80) -9.26 (10.35) -5.27 (11.53) 












































1 Standard errors in parentheses 





























Figure 1 Moderating Effects of CEO Power on Relevant Field Experience 
 
 
 
